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Casenotes
LIKE A CANDLE IN THE WIND: SHAW FAMILY ARCHIVES,
LTD. V. CMG WORLDWIDE, INC. AND THE
FLICKERING RECOGNITION OF MARILYN
MONROE'S RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
IN NEW YORK
I.

INTRODUCTION

Every year, Forbes Magazine lists the highest-earning deceased
celebrities.' In 2007, the top thirteen now-gone actors, authors,
and musicians earned a combined $232 million from the distribution of their works and the licensing of their likenesses. 2 Not surprisingly, the iconic American sex symbol Marilyn Monroe is a
perennial member of this elite list.3 Forty-six years after her death,

the great demand for Monroe's persona earned her estate $7 mil1. See generally Lea Goldman &Jake Paine, Top-EarningDead Celebrities, FORBES,
Oct. 29, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/2007/10/29/dead-celebrity-earning-bizmedia-deadcelebs07-cz-lg_1029celebland.html (describing top-earning celebrity
list criteria).
2. See id. (reporting total income from top-earning estates). The highest earning estate was that of celebrated entertainer Elvis Presley, which generated $49
million from licensing agreements and increased attendance at Graceland, the artist's former home, during the thirty-year anniversary of his death. See id. Musician
Bob Marley and actor James Dean represented the low-end earners of these thirteen with their estates making $4 million and $3.5 million, respectively, from the
licensing of their various works and likenesses. See id.
3. See id. (ranking Monroe ninth on list, earning $7 million in 2007); see also
Lacey Rose, et al., Top-EarningDead Celebrities, FORBES, Oct. 23 2006, http://www.
forbes.com/2006/10/23/tech-media_06deadcelebs-cx-pk-top-earning-dead-celebritiesland.html (ranking Monroe ninth in 2006, earning $8 million); Leah
Hoffman, et al., Top-EarningDead Celebrities, FORBES, Oct. 25, 2005, http://www.
forbes.com/2005/10/26/dead-celebrities-earnings-cx-pk-lh-deadceleb05_1027
list_7.html (ranking Monroe seventh, earning $8 million in 2005); Lisa DiCarlo, et
al., Top-Earning Dead Celebrities, FORBES, Oct. 26, 2004, http://www.forbes.com/
2004/10/25/cx_2004deadcelebtears_6.html (placing Monroe sixth on list, earning $8 million in 2004); Lisa DiCarlo, ed., Top-EarningDead Celebrities, FORBES, Oct.
24, 2003, http://www.forbes.com/2003/10/23/cx ld-deadcelebtear_10.html
(ranking Monroe tenth in 2003, earning $8 million); Betsy Schiffman, ed., TopEarningDead Celebrities, FORBES, Aug. 12, 2002, http://www.forbes.com/lists/2002/
08/12/0812deadintro.html (placing Monroe eleventh, earning $7 million in
2002); Mei Fong & Debra Lau, Earnings From The Crypt, FORBES, Feb. 28, 2001,
http://www.forbes.com/2001/02/28/crypt.html (ranking Monroe twelfth on first
reported list of top-earning dead celebrities, earning $4 million in 2001); Shaw
Family Archives, Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 309, 312 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (discussing Monroe's icon status). The court referred to Monroe as "perhaps the most famous American sex symbol of the twentieth century." Id.
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lion in 2007, primarily derived from licensing agreements for advertisements and merchandise. 4 A recent battle over licensing
infringement may, however, leave Monroe's heirs without control
over her likeness.

5

In Shaw Family Archives, Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York found
that in 1962, the year Monroe died, New York did not recognize a
transferable postmortem right of publicity. 6 Well-settled New York
estate law allows testators to devise only the transferable rights they
possess at the time of their deaths. 7 Because the court found that
the right of publicity did not exist, Monroe did not possess the right
when she died; therefore, her will could not have conveyed the
right to her heirs.8 This finding defeated any claim of ownership
and thrust Monroe's persona into the public domain, where anyone is free to use it.9
This note will explore the existence of a descendible right of
publicity in New York State at the time of Monroe's death.' 0 Section II will describe the facts and procedural history of Shaw Family
Archives.1 Section III will trace the evolution of the right of publicity, including both the tort-based right of privacy and the modern
4. See Goldman & Paine, supra note 1 (noting Monroe estate's income in
2007). In recent years, Monroe's estate entered into licensing agreements for advertisements and products bearing Monroe's likeness as well as a new perfume
line. See Rose, et al., supra note 3 (describing Monroe estate's different sources of
income).
5. See Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314 (finding postmortem right
of publicity did not exist when Monroe's will was executed). For further discussion
of Shaw Family Archives, see infra notes 10146 and accompanying text.
6. See Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314 (describing court's ruling).
For a further discussion of the court's interpretation of New York law, see infra
notes 10146 and accompanying text.
7. See Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 315 (discussing New York estate
law).
8. See id. at 314 (holding that right of publicity did not exist). Monroe could
not have possessed the right of publicity at the time of her death, which is required
for inheritance under New York law. See id. at 315.
9. See id. at 320 (granting Shaw Family Archives' cross-motion for summary
judgment). The court held that no postmortem right of publicity existed, and
therefore Marilyn Monroe LLC could not claim to be predecessors-in-interest to
the right. See id.
10. See, e.g., Haelan Labs. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.
1953) (discussing history of right of publicity and finding common law right of
publicity existed in New York in 1953). But see Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d
579, 586 (2d Cir. 1990) (determining New York privacy statutes leave no room for
common law right of publicity). For a further discussion of the existence of the
right of publicity in New York, see infra notes 170-218 and accompanying text.
11. For a further discussion of the facts of Shaw Family Archives, see infra notes
16-29 and accompanying text.
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property-based right of publicity. 12 Section IV will evaluate the
court's holding that Monroe's estate is not the predecessor-in-interest to her right of publicity.' Section V, after thoroughly examining New York law in this field, will evaluate the appropriateness of
the court's determination. 14 Finally, Section VI will discuss the effect this decision may have both on New York law and the estates of
other legendary American entertainers.15
II.

FACTS

The original dispute arose in the state of Indiana from the sale
of a t-shirt that bore the photograph of Marilyn Monroe and the
maintenance of a website that licensed the photograph. 16 Shaw
Family Archives, Ltd. and Bradford Licensing Associates ("SFA")
produced the t-shirt and website. 17 Marilyn Monroe, LLC
("MMLLC") and CMG Worldwide, Inc. ("CMG") filed a complaint
against SFA in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana, claiming unauthorized use of Monroe's right of
publicity.1 8 Under Indiana's Right of Publicity Act, one cannot use
12. For a further discussion of the history of the right of publicity, see
notes 63-81 and accompanying text.
13. For a further discussion of the district court's opinion, see infra notes
46 and accompanying text.
14. For a further discussion of the right of publicity in New York, see
notes 170-218 and accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of the impact of Shaw Family Archives, see
notes 226-39 and accompanying text.

infra
101infra
infra

16. See Shaw Family Archives, Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d
309, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (discussing original dispute). A single t-shirt was sold at
a Target store in Indianapolis, Indiana on September 6, 2006 bearing an image of
Marilyn Monroe. See id. The dispute was also predicated on a website where licenses "for the use of Ms. Monroe's picture, image and likeness on various commercial products" were sold. Id.
17. See id. at 312-13 (describing "SFA" organizations). Shaw Family Archives,
Ltd. is a limited liability company "with its primary place of business in New York."
Id. at 312. The principals of SFA are the three children of the late Sam Shaw, an
accomplished photographer who took many photographs of Monroe during her
life. See id. at 313. The main assets of the company are the "canonical" images of
Marilyn Monroe. Id.
18. See id. at 310, 312 (describing MMLLC and CMG organizations). MMLLC
is a Delaware company formed by Anna Strasberg, the sole heir of Marilyn
Monroe's estate, to manage the intellectual property assets of the estate. See id.; see
also CMG Worldwide - Corporate - Overview, http://www.cmgworldwide.com/corporate/overview.htm (last visited May 1, 2008) (outlining corporate location and
services). CMG Worldwide notes that it is based in Indianapolis, Indiana and is the
business and marketing agent for celebrities including Marilyn Monroe. See id.
The court referred to the combined defendants as MMLLC, likely because it is the
party that claimed ownership over Monroe's likeness.
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another's right of publicity - a property right - for commercial

purposes without the owner's consent.' 9
MMLLC claimed that Marilyn Monroe's right of publicity
transferred to the estate when she died testate on August 5, 1962.20
MMLLC contended the residuary clause of Monroe's will transferred all property not otherwise described in the will, including
the right of publicity. 21 Conversely, SFA claimed the right did not
transfer because New York State - her alleged domicile at death
and, therefore, controlling jurisdiction on the execution of her will
22
- did not recognize a descendible postmortem right of publicity.

Before being served with the Indiana action, SFA brought a
separate suit against MMLLC and CMG in New York seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the existence of Monroe's right of
publicity. 23 Eventually, the Indiana and New York causes of action
19. See IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-1 (West 2002) (outlining Indiana publicity
rights); see also id. §§ 32-36-1-2 -20 (defining and clarifying Indiana statutory
protection).
20. See Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 313-14 (citing MMLLC's contention). Although the will did not expressly bequeath her right of publicity, the
family contended that the residuary clause transferred all property. See id.
21. See id. at 314 (claiming transfer of publicity rights through residuary
clause); id. at 312 (tracing transfer of Monroe's right of publicity among parties).
MMLLC reported the residuary clause of Marilyn Monroe's will:
SIXTH: All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and
personal of whatsoever nature and whatsoever situate, of which I shall die
seized or possessed or to which I shall be in any way entitled, or over
which I shall possess any power of appointment by Will at the time of my
death, including any lapsed legacies, I give, devise and bequeath as
follows:
(a) To MAY REIS the sum of $40,000 or 25% of the total remainder of my
estate, whichever shall be the lesser.
(b) To DR. MARIANNE KRIS 25% of the balance thereof, to be used by
her as set forth in ARTICLE FIFTH (d) of this my Last Will and
Testament.
(c) To LEE STRASBERG the entire remaining balance.
Id. MMLLC contended that the residuary clause transferred the publicity interest,
like all other remaining property, to Lee Strasberg at the time of Monroe's death.
See id. This remainder then transferred to the sole beneficiary of Lee Strasberg's
will, his wife Anna Strasberg, upon his death in 1982. See id. Anna Strasberg became administratrix of the Monroe estate in 1989 when the original administrator,
Monroe's attorney, died. See id. Finally, in 2001, Anna Strasberg closed the estate
and transferred all assets to MMLLC. See id. Thus, MMLLC contends that it controlled Monroe's right to publicity based on the residuary clause of her will. See id.
at 314.
22. See id. at 311-12 (claiming New York State law does not recognize postmortem right of publicity). SFA further claimed that New York law allows only the
transfer of property that the testator controlled at the time of his or her death. See
id. at 313-14. For a further discussion of the debate over Monroe's domicile at her
time of death, see infra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
23. See Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 310-11 (reporting lawsuit
brought in New York by SFA and others). On April 19, 2005, SFA sought a declara-
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were consolidated. 24 Though the consolidated action came before
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, the court determined that Indiana law applied. 25 On October
25, 2006, MMLLC moved for summary judgment, claiming 100%
ownership of properties derived from Monroe's right of publicity
under Indiana law. 26 SFA filed a cross-motion for summary judgment claiming that the Indiana publicity statute does not create a
new and independent postmortem right of publicity, but merely a
way to exercise a pre-existing right. 2 7 Moreover, SFA claimed that
Monroe lacked the testamentary capacity to bequeath her right of
publicity because the right was not recognized as a descendible
property right at the time of her death. 28 The district court granted
toryjudgment on whether a postmortem right of publicity or right of privacy exists. See id. at 310. The suit also sought damages for "certain alleged copyright
infringement violations, tortious interference with contractual relations and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage." Id. at 310-11.
24. See id. at 311 (describing procedural posture of case). On June 3, 2005,
MMLLC and CMG filed a motion seeking transfer, dismissal, or a stay of the SFA's
New York suit. See id. After being served with the Indiana lawsuit, SFA filed a
motion for dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction in Indiana, or in the alternative, a request to transfer the Indiana action to the Southern District of New York.
See id. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
ordered a stay on SFA's New York suit pending the determination of personal jurisdiction in the Indiana action. See id. On March 23, 2006, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1404(a), ordered the Indiana action to be transferred to the Southern District of New York.
See id. The Southern District of New York then lifted the stay on SFA's New York
suit on March 27, 2006, and consolidated the matters on May 2, 2006. See id.
25. See Shaw Family Archives, Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 2d
203, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (memorandum decision regarding choice of law) (finding Indiana law applicable). The court found that the Indiana long-arm statute,
recently amended to approach the limitations of due process, created specific personal jurisdiction. See id. at 208. The court determined that, because SFA was
"amenable to jurisdiction in Indiana," Indiana choice-of-law rules would apply. Id.
at 210. The court therefore applied Indiana's "first to file" rule, giving the Indiana
lawsuit commenced by MMLLC and CMG priority over the New York lawsuit filed
by SFA. See id. Finding no special circumstances to justify departure from this
rule, the Southern District of New York consequently applied Indiana law. See id.
26. See Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 311 (discussing MMLLC's
grounds for motion for summary judgment). MMLLC claims that the Indiana
Right of Publicity Act applied regardless of Monroe's domicile at the time of her
death. See id. Further, MMLLC claims its right to control Monroe's likeness was
violated under the Indiana statute because the t-shirt and website were made available to Indiana residents. See id.
27. See id. (discussing SFA's cross-motion for summary judgment).
28. See id. at 311-12 (discussing second part of SFA's cross-motion for summary judgment). SFA claimed that neither California nor New York, the two states
where Monroe was possibly domiciled at the time of her death, recognized a postmortem right of publicity at the time of her death. See id. SFA also claimed that
MMLLC should be judicially and collaterally estopped from arguing that Monroe
was domiciled in California when she died because for forty years the estate
claimed she was domiciled in New York. See id. at 312. For firther discussion of
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SFA's motion for summary judgment, finding MMLLC and CMG
29
did not control Marilyn Monroe's likeness.
III.

BACKGROUND

The heart of the case is the distinction between the right of
privacy and the right of publicity. 30 The common law rights of publicity and privacy have distinctly different domains. 31 Though privacy and publicity are often thought of as a single legal concept,
Professor Melville Nimmer noted in 1954 that publicity is more
aptly described as the "reverse side of the coin of privacy, '32 con-

cluding that one's right to solitude is quite different from one's
33
right to control his or her public persona.
This Section will present a history of the personal right of privacy and its statutory forms. 34 The Section will then examine the
evolution of the property-based right of publicity inherent in one's
likeness, which may be a statutory or common law right.35 Finally,

this Section will discuss the current recognition of these rights in
36
the jurisdictions pertinent to Shaw Family Archives.
A.

The Right of Privacy

Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis first proposed a right of
privacy in 1890, with a focus on preventing the offensive use of a
person's likeness. 37 Their logic stemmed from a series of gradual
Monroe's domicile on the day of her death, see infra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
29. See Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 312 (reporting court's holding). For a further discussion of the court's reasoning, see infra notes 101-46 and
accompanying text.
30. See Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 313-14 (stating disagreement
between parties over recognized rights).
31. See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS.
203, 203-04 (1954) (discussing control of public and private affairs).
32. Id. at 204 (writing in reaction to new scholarly works proclaiming right to
privacy).
33. See id. (describing inadequacy of right of privacy for mid-twentieth century
entertainment industry).

34. For a further discussion of privacy rights, see infra notes 37-62 and accompanying text.
35. For a further discussion of the right of publicity, see infra notes 63-81 and
accompanying text.
36. For a further discussion of current recognition of publicity, see infra notes
82-100 and accompanying text.
37. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,4 HLARV. L.
REv. 193, 195-96 (1890) (proposing cause of action based on emotional distress
caused by public exposure of private affairs); see also Nimmer, supra note 31, at 20607 (discussing impetus for Brandeis and Warren article). Brandeis and Warren
were inspired to write their now famous article after a Boston newspaper reported
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expansions in the jurisprudence surrounding the constitutional
right to liberty. 38 Focusing on emotional injury rather than economic injury, Warren and Brandeis found the right to privacy to be
a personal right, rather than a commercially valuable property
right.3 9 Courts first recognized Warren and Brandeis's conception
of the right of privacy in the landmark case Pavesich v. New England
40
Life Insurance Co.
In Pavesich, the defendant insurance company used an image
of the plaintiff in a newspaper advertisement that encouraged readers to buy life insurance policies from the defendant. 4 1 The Georgia Supreme Court reasoned that because the photograph of the
plaintiff was recognizable to his friends and acquaintances, and because it falsely indicated his purchase of a policy, New England Life
Insurance had violated the plaintiff's right to privacy. 42 The court
reasoned that the right of privacy derived from natural law. 43 The
court also offered its understanding of the right to privacy as an
essential aspect of the American ideal of liberty, a far broader concept than the comparatively simple ideas of restraint, servitude and
"in lurid detail the activities of Samuel Warren and his wife." Id. at 206; see also
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 383 (1960) (describing motivation
for Brandeis and Warren article).
38. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 37, at 193 (summarizing reasoning).
Warren and Brandeis discussed how the right to liberty was originally understood
to include freedom from battery. See id. at 193-94. This freedom from injury
evolved into a freedom from the fear of such injury when the concept of assault
was born. See id. at 194. Some time later came the "qualified protection" from
disturbances under nuisance law. See id. The authors claimed that the right to
liberty left the realm of purely physical actions when slander and libel laws created
protection for a person's reputation. See id.
39. See id. at 197 (distinguishing between injured reputation and hurt feelings
in libel suits).
40. See Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 69 (Ga. 1905) (finding
violation of right of privacy for use of photograph in public advertisement); see also
Harold R. Gordon, Right of PropertyIn Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 Nw.
U. L. REv. 553, 558-59 (1960) (citing Pavesich as landmark right of privacy
decision).
41. See Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 68-69 (describing plaintiff's misappropriation
claim). The defendant insurance company ran an advertisement in an Atlanta
newspaper that used images of two men. See id. at 68. Above the image of the
plaintiff, who appeared to be of good health, read the words: "Do it now. The man
who did." Id. Above the image of the other man, who was "ill-dressed and sickly
looking" read the words: "Do it while you can. The man who didn't." Id.
42. See id. at 79 (finding in favor of plaintiff).
43. See id. at 70 (discussing history of privacy rights). The court found that
even though individuals surrender certain rights as part of their participation in a
society, they do not surrender those rights that are presumed to be private. See id.
at 79-80. The court subsequently found that a person's right to exclusive control
of his or her likeness is one of those presumptively private rights. See id. at 80.
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freedom from imprisonment. 44 Both the Georgia Supreme Court's
natural law approach and its conceptualization of liberty as a broad
American ideal are consistent with Warren and Brandeis's sugges45
tion that the right of privacy is an inalienable personal right.
In tort, a violation of a personal right is understood as an injury to the individual. 46 Scholars have noted that actions for invasion of privacy grounded in tort trace back to Warren and
Brandeis's initial focus on "offensive use." 4 7 After Pavesich, many
courts continued to require this offensive use criterion, requiring
some level of personal embarrassment or humiliation to prove an
actionable injury. 4 8 Only later would scholars recognize the possible damage to one's persona through lucrative, rather than offensive, improper conduct.

49

In 1960, in his aptly-titled article, Privacy, Dean William L. Prosser offered the next crucial writing in the development of the right
of privacy.50 Prosser's article was a response to Warren and Brandeis's tort-based discussion of the right of privacy. 51 Prosser found
that jurisdictions varied greatly in their recognition of the right,
and thatjudicial opinions across the country were marked by inconsistencies and a preoccupation with questions of the right's applica44. See id. at 70 (describing right of privacy as part of American liberty). The
court concluded that liberty "includes the right to live as one will, so long as that
will does not interfere with the rights of another or of the public." Id. Liberty
includes an individual's right to remain secluded, or the right to keep private certain aspects of his or her life that the law does not otherwise require to be disclosed, such as by the giving of witness testimony. See id.
45. Compare Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 70 ("The right of one to exhibit himself to the
public at all proper times, in all proper places, and in a proper manner is embraced within the right of personal liberty."), with Warren & Brandeis, supra note
37, at 199 ("In every such case the individual is entitled to decide whether that
which is his shall be given to the public."). Natural law is concerned with the basic
freedoms, both physical and emotional, of humankind. See Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 70.
The idea of liberty is equally concerned with these personal freedoms. See id.
46. See Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 73 (describing violations as tort invasions of personal rights).
47. Nimmer, supra note 31, at 206-07 (discussing Warren and Brandeis's
goals). After a Boston newspaper published a story about Warren and his wife,
Warren and Brandeis began to work on the topic of privacy. See id. at 206. Their
concern was offensive use, something quite different from non-offensive publicity.
See id. at 207.
48. See id. at 207 (discussing offensive nature of privacy actions). Manyjurisdictions adopted the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, bringing with it the requirement that
conduct offend one of "ordinary sensibilities" to be actionable. See id.
49. See Prosser, supra note 37, at 401-07 (recognizing individuals may appropriate likeness of another for pecuniary gain).
50. See id. at 384-85 (confronting courts' confused application of privacy
rights).
51. See id. at 383 (discussing personal injury motivation of Warren and Brandeis article).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol15/iss2/3

8

Fuller: Like a Candle in the Wind: Shaw Family Archives, LTD. v. CMG Worl

2008]

SHAW FAMILY ARCHIVES, LTD. V.

CMG

WORLDWIDE, INC.

307

bility. 52 He contended the confusion likely stemmed from a broad
and somewhat simplistic understanding of the right. 53 Prosser
therefore offered a more detailed understanding of the right of privacy, narrowing the broad tort into four specific types of conduct or
interests. 54 The first privacy interest was intrusion into one's seclusion, solitude or private affairs. 5 5 The second privacy interest focused on "public disclosure of private facts. '56 The third created a
cause of action for plaintiffs who were placed in a false light in the
public eye. 57 The fourth privacy interest arose out of the value of
one's persona and the gains that can be made by appropriating it.58
Prosser acknowledged that unauthorized use of a person's persona,
both offensive and non-offensive, was grounds for suit.59 The first
three sections of Prosser's analysis dealt with tort injuries caused by
unauthorized use of a person's persona. 60 Because it focused specifically on the gains made by the unauthorized use of a public per52. See id. at 386-88 (citing adoption by states). At the time of publication
twenty-six states and the District of Columbia recognized the right of privacy. See
id. at 386-87. The right was likely to be upheld in seven more states. See id. at 38788. Four states recognized some limited form of the right. See id. at 388. Just four
states - Rhode Island, Texas, Nebraska, and Wisconsin - had outrightly rejected the
right of privacy. See id. Hawaii, which had gained statehood in 1959, was not included in Dean Prosser's evaluation. See id. at 386-88.
53. See id. at 389 (discussing more complex system of privacy rights).
54. See id. (outlining four types of privacy rights).
55. See id. at 389-92 (discussing intrusions into personal privacy). Prosser
traces the right's evolution from physical intrusions to eavesdropping and eventually to modern means of prying into private affairs. See id. at 390. Prosser stresses
that the "intrusion" prong of his evaluation is designed to deal with mental trauma.
See id. at 392. Specifically, intrusion is meant "to fill in the gaps left by trespass,
nuisance and the intentional infliction of mental distress." Id.
56. Id. at 392-98 (discussing public disclosure of private affairs). Prosser
noted that this was the type of privacy that Warren and Brandeis emphasized seventy years before. See id. at 392. The necessary showings under this prong are
threefold: (1) the disclosure must be public, (2) the facts disclosed must be private, and (3) the disclosure must offend a "reasonable man of ordinary sensibilities." Id. at 393-96. Prosser characterized this privacy interest as "reputation, with
the same overtones of mental distress that are present in libel and slander." Id. at
398.
57. See id. at 398-401 (describing false light in public eye). This interest is
violated when "some opinion or utterance" is falsely attributed to a public figure.
Id. at 398. This interest has found limited use in the courts, but is nonetheless a
distinct tort. See id.
58. See id. at 401-07 (discussing differences between appropriation and other
invasions).
59. See id. at 403 (finding name "piracy" constitutes violation). This prong of
Prosser's discussion focuses on the use of one's likeness by another for some type
of pecuniary gain. See id. Such use does not require that embarrassment or humiliation befall the owner of the persona; in fact, the "pirate" is likely deriving his or
her gains from the strength and credibility of the persona. See id.
60. See id. at 401 (opining Warren and Brandeis's conception of privacy encompassed Prosser's first three prongs).
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sona, the fourth section was fundamentally different from, and
vitally important to, the evolution of privacy and publicity. 6 1 Prosser's analysis was the last major contribution to the right of privacy
debate before August 5, 1962, which is the determinative date for
62
Marilyn Monroe's rights: the date of her death.
B.

The Right of Publicity

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals first coined the term
"right of publicity" in 1953.63 In this groundbreaking case, Haelan
Laboratories,Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, the court agreed that privacy
statutes appropriately protected a person's right to be free from
emotional injury. 64 The court also found, however, that the law
should protect a person's right to derive pecuniary value from his
or her likeness. 65 The court held that, similar to other forms of
valuable property, a person must be able to maintain (or grant to
another person) exclusive control of his or her likeness. 66
The dispute in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. arose between rival
chewing gum manufacturers who both claimed a right to use a professional baseball player's likeness on trading cards included in
their packs of gum. 6 7 The ballplayer had signed a contract with the

plaintiff company granting exclusive use of his photograph. 68 Although the defendant company was aware of this agreement, it continued to pursue the ballplayer and eventually obtained his
permission to use his photograph. 69 The defendant claimed that
under New York law, the right of privacy was not transferable and
61. See id. at 406-07 (discussing Nimmer's concept of publicity). Prosser mentioned the right of publicity as was recently coined by the Second Circuit's decision
in Haelan Labs. v. Topps Chewing Gum. See id. He entertained the idea that this
fourth type of privacy, could be considered property, and may require a different
type of analysis than the other privacy torts. See id.
62. See id. at 383 (being published in August 1960, just two years before
Monroe's death on August 5, 1962).
63. See Haelan Labs. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953)
(drawing sharp distinction between privacy rights and publicity rights).
64. See id. at 868 (finding New York derives privacy protection from statute).
65. See id. (describing court's rationale). The court held that a celebrity's
damages do not stem merely from the embarrassment or emotional damage that
the right of privacy is designed to protect, but additionally from the lack of remuneration from the unauthorized use of his or her likeness. See id.
66. See id. (holding common law right of publicity protects granting of right
to exclude).
67. See id. at 867 (describing case facts).
68. See id. (discussing contract between plaintiff and ballplayer). In addition,
the ballplayer agreed not to grant a similar right to any other gum manufacturer
during the period of the contract. See id.
69. See id. (describing defendant's actions and knowledge). The contract between the defendant and the ballplayer authorized the defendant to use the ballp-
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the ballplayer's contracts indicated consent. 70 Where there is consent, the defendant reasoned, there is no invasion of privacy. 7' The
court disagreed with both contentions, finding that "in addition to
and independent of that right of privacy (which New York derives
from statute), man has a right in the publicity of his photograph,
i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture. '7 2 The Haelan Laboratories court recognized that a personal
injury-based concept of privacy was insufficient in the realm of celebrity. 73 The freshly minted "right of publicity," however, would
secure an individual's right to exclude others from using his or her
74
likeness without remuneration.
Critical analysis of the right of publicity continued to develop
with the publication of Professor Melville Nimmer's influential article, The Right of Publicity, just a year after the Haelan Laboratories
case. 75 Professor Nimmer's discussion of the right of publicity centered on the idea that it is the "first principle of Anglo-American
jurisprudence, an axiom of the most fundamental nature, that
every person is entitled to the fruit of his labors unless there are
important countervailing public policy considerations. ' 76 Professor
Nimmer found that traditional legal theories, such as the tort-based
layer's photograph to promote the sale of its gum. See id. It did not, however,
include an exclusivity provision. See id.
70. See id. (describing defendant's argument). The defendant cited N.Y. Crv.
RIGHTS LAw sections 50-51 (McKinney 1992) to support the contention that only
violations of privacy were actionable under New York law. See id. The defendant
claimed that the statutory right was personal, and therefore was not transferred in
the ballplayer's contract with the plaintiff. See id.
71. See id. at 868 (discussing contracts as consent). The defendant contended
that the contracts the ballplayer made with both the plaintiff and with the defendant acted as releases of liability. See id. These releases authorized both parties to
use the ballplayer's likeness without fear of legal action. See id.
72. Id. (emphasis added). The court found that affixing the label of "property" right was immaterial to the action. See id. The court found that the ideological step forward of protecting things of pecuniary value was more important than a
label. See id.
73. See id. ("For it is common knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their likeness, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received
money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed
in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and subways.").
74. See id. (discussing affected celebrities' financial deprivation). Individuals
cannot make money from their likenesses if they do not exclusively control the
right to grant them. See id.
75. See Nimmer, supra note 31, at 204 (commending Judge Frank's application of publicity in Haelan Labs.).
76. Id. at 216. Nimmer contends thatjudicial recognition of the right of publicity as a property right is essential to uphold this basic belief. See id.
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understanding of privacy as a personal right, were inadequate to
77
deal with the idea that a persona is something of value.
Professor Nimmer contended that traditional theories proved
inadequate in four notable ways: first, in order to retain pecuniary
value, the right of publicity must be assignable; second, there
should be a cause of action regardless of whether the likeness was
used in an offensive manner; third, damages ought to be computed
in terms of the value of the publicity to the defendant, rather then
the injury to the plaintiff; and fourth, that no waiver of this right
should occur because one becomes a well-known personality. 78 In
addition to these legal misunderstandings, Nimmer noted that
courts could use unfair competition doctrines as a possible, but inevitably inadequate, means of redress for misappropriation of likeness. 79 The Second Circuit's opinion in Haelan Laboratories
combined with the writings of influential scholars, such as Prosser
and Nimmer, carved out the domain of publicity as something distinct from existing statutory law. 80 With the right of publicity established as a separate legal concept from that of privacy, the states
were left to decide whether to codify publicity as a transferable
property right.8 1
C.

Current Recognition in Relevant Jurisdictions

In Shaw Family Archives, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit applied Indiana law. 82 As per Indiana law, the court was to
determine Monroe's domicile, either California or New York, and
77. See id. at 204-10 (discussing weaknesses of traditional legal theories). Nimmer rejects the traditional legal understandings of each of the four issues he discusses throughout the article. See id.
78. See id. at 216 (summarizing shortcomings of traditional theories).
79. See id. at 210-14 (describing inadequacy of unfair competition doctrine).
Nimmer found that the unfair competition doctrine does recognize the pecuniary
value of likeness. See id. at 210. Nevertheless, the requirements of competition
between the plaintiff and defendant, the "passing off" of goods under the likeness,
and the inability to assign one's likeness in gross, make the doctrine of unfair competition inadequate. See id. at 210-12.
80. Compare Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 868 (stating "in addition to and independent of that right of privacy ... man has a right in the publicity value of his
photograph"), with Prosser, supra note 37, at 406-07 (differentiating fourth prong
of privacy analysis), and Nimmer, supra note 31, at 204-15 (finding current legal
theories inadequate protection for publicity rights).
81. See Prosser, supra note 37, at 407 (discussing varied jurisdictional
application).
82. See Shaw Family Archives, Ltd. v.CMG Worldwide, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d
309, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (applying Indiana law because cause of action arose
within that state).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol15/iss2/3

12

Fuller: Like a Candle in the Wind: Shaw Family Archives, LTD. v. CMG Worl

2008] SHAW FAMILY ARCHIVES, LTD. V. CMG WORLDWIDE,

INC.

311

construe her will according to law of that state.83 This Section will
offer a brief overview of the current understanding of the right of
84
publicity in the pertinent jurisdictions.
In Indiana, the right of publicity is statutory.8 5 The Indiana
law, passed in 1994, defines the right of publicity as an individual's
property interest in name, voice, signature, photograph, image,
likeness, distinctive appearance, gestures, or mannerisms.8 6 Indiana law defines the owner of a publicity right as either (1) the individual himself or herself or (2) a person to whom the right has
transferred. 8 7 Such rights can be transferred through contract, license, gift, trust, testamentary document, or by the operation of
intestate succession law in the state where the will is administered. 88
In California, as in Indiana, the right of publicity is statutory. 89
,Because California created Civil Code Section 3344.1 in 1984, the
adoption of a statutory right is also a relatively recent occurrence. 90
California law prohibits the unauthorized use of the "name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness" of a deceased personality. 9 1 A
person using any of these elements of persona for advertising, selling, or soliciting purchases without prior consent of the owner of
the persona is liable under the statute. 92 Subsection (b) of the stat83. See id. at 314 (finding domicile determination unnecessary because outcome is unaffected).
84. For a further discussion the court's application of the laws of the various
jurisdictions, see infra notes 105-17 and accompanying text.
85. See IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-1 (West 2002) (outlining right of publicity in
Indiana); see also id. §§ 32-36-1-2 -20 (defining and clarifying Indiana statutory
protection).
86. See id. § 32-36-1-7 (defining statutory bounds of what constitutes likeness).
87. See id. § 32-36-1-17 (defining statutory ownership).
88. See id. § 32-36-1-16 (outlining transfer procedures). The code explicitly
states that rights can be transferred through a testamentary document. See id.
89. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 3344.1 (West 1999) (defining right of publicity in
California). It is important to note that in 2007 the California legislature amended
section 3344.1 of the California Civil Code to recognize the publicity rights of

those who died prior to the bill's enactment. See CAL. Ctv. CODE § 3344.1(b) (West
2007). Moreover, the legislature clearly indicated that Shaw Family Archives was one
of the cases it intended to abrogate with its amendment. See id. As the court in
Shaw Family Archives based its opinion on the statute before this amendment, this
note will refer to the 1999 version of section 3344.1, the last amendment prior to
2007.
90. See Shaw Family Archives, Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d
309, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (stating adoption of California statute occurred twentytwo years after Monroe's death); see also Laura Parker, Photographers'Heirs Seek A
Cut of Monroe Fortune, USA TODAY, Oct. 2, 2007, at 4A, available at http://
www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-10-01-monroe-estateN.htm?csp=34
(describing recent statutory amendment efforts).
91. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344.1 (a)(1) (West 1999).
92. See id. (explaining parameters of California's publicity right).
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ute clearly states that the right of publicity is a property right, and
93
as such is freely transferable.
Unlike Indiana or California, New York does not presently recognize a statutory or common law right of publicity. 94 In 1984, the
New York Court of Appeals held that New York privacy statutes encompass any parallel common law right of publicity. 95 New York
Civil Rights Law Sections 50 and 51 ("New York privacy statutes")
govern privacy law in the state of New York. 96 The statutes were
originally adopted in 1903, just thirteen years after the influential
Warren-Brandeis article on the subject. 9 7 Section 50 prohibits the
use of one's "name, portrait, or picture" for trade or advertisement
without written consent; Section 51 provides remedies. 9 8 It appears

that New York may have once recognized a common law right of
publicity in addition to the right of privacy outlined by statute.99
Nevertheless, the varied application of the privacy statutes by state
93. See id. § 3344.1(b) (describing statutory right as property right).
94. See Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 586 (2d Cir. 1990) (denying
claim of common law publicity right infringement under New York law).
95. See Stephano v. New Group Publ'ns., 474 N.E.2d 580, 583-84 (N.Y. 1984)
(holding New York privacy statutes encompass any common law right of publicity);

see also Alain J. Lapter, How the Other Half Lives (Revisited): Twenty Years Since Midler
v. Ford - A Global Perspective on the Right of Publicity, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 239,
262-63 (2007) (tracing history of New York privacy statutes).
96. See N.Y. Crv. RIGHTs LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992) (stating New York
privacy rights); see alsoPirone,894 F.2d at 585-86 (reviewing statutes' predominance
in area of law). But see Sara L. Edelman, Death Pays: The Fight Over Marilyn Monroe's
Publicity Rights, THE METRO. CORP. COUNS.,July 2007, at 39, availableat http://www.

metrocorpcounsel.com/current.php?artType=view&artMonth=July&artYear=
2007&EntryNo=6903 (predicting legislative reevaluation of privacy statute).
97. See Lapter, supra note 95, at 262-63 (discussing motivation behind adoption of New York privacy statutes). In 1902, the NewYork Court of Appeals decided
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902), in which a teenage
plaintiff felt humiliated by the widespread distribution of an advertisement that
bore his likeness. See id. In a narrow decision the court insinuated that legislative
action would be appropriate on this matter. See id. Soon after the decision was
handed down, the legislature enacted the New York privacy statutes. See id.
98. See N.Y. Civ. RIHTs LAw § 50 (McKinney 1992) (outlining protected privacy rights). The statute provides:
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for
the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person
without having first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a
minor of his or her parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id.; see also id. § 51 (outlining remedies for violation of N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW section 50 (McKinney 1992)).
99. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., revd on other grounds, 579 F.2d 215,
221 (2d Cir. 1978) (discussing transferable nature of publicity rights in New York);
see also Haelan Labs. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953)
(coining phrase "right of publicity" in application of New York law); Groucho
Marx Prods. v. Day & Night Co., rev'd on other grounds, 523 F. Supp. 485, 487-88
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (recognizing New York publicity right); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, 400 F. Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), abrogatedbyJim Henson Prods. v.John
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courts has not stopped the New York Court of Appeals from ceasing
to recognize the right.]()°
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Narrative Analysis

In Shaw Family Archives, Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., the court
focused on three main issues in granting summary judgment in
favor of SFA.' 0 First, the court held that "Ms. Monroe did not have
the testamentary capacity to devise the property rights she did not
own at the time of her death."' 0 2 Second, the court found that
Monroe did not "intend" to leave any rights that may later be recognized by either Indiana or California publicity statutes.' 0 3 Third,
the court found neither the Indiana nor California statutes allowed
for the creation of a postmortem right of publicity for persons who
10 4
died before enactment of the respective statutes.
1.

The Court's Concern With Three Jurisdictions

The court analyzed the possible application of New York, California, or Indiana law to the proceeding. 10 5 Before examining the
T. Brady & Assoc., 867 F. Supp. 175, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding evidence of
descendible right of publicity in New York).
100. See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 447 (N.Y. 1902)
(prompting legislature to enact privacy statute); see also Gautier v. Pro-Football,
Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485, 487 (N.Y. 1952) (recognizing pecuniary value of misappropriated likeness); Brinkley v. Casablancas, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1009 (N.Y. App. Div.
1981) (holding statutes may protect public figures who have not given consent);
Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 427 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)
(finding First Amendment concerns limited statutory protection); Lomax v. New
Broadcasting Co., 238 N.Y.S.2d 781, 782 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963) (noting partial defenses to statutory written consent requirement); Pittera v. Parade Publ'ns., 225
N.Y.S.2d 478, 478 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962) (holding statute requires use of likeness
for trade); Moglen v. Varsity Pajamas, Inc., 213 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1001 (N.Y. App. Div.
1961) (finding statute requires persona used for trade or advertisement); Miller v.
Universal Pictures Co., 201 N.Y.S.2d 632, 634 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960) (finding plaintiff did not own property right in big band sound); Schneiderman v. New York Post
Corp., 220 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961) (finding consent released defendant from liability).
101. See Shaw Family Archives, Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d
309, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (outlining legal issues of case).
102. Id. at 314.
103. See id. at 317-19 (finding New York estate law does not allow division of
rights not owned at time of passing). Though the Indiana statute would control in
this case, the court offered an interpretation of California law to show that the
jurisdictions unanimously reject the maturation of a transferable publicity right
after death, regardless of testator intent. See id. at 319.
104. See id. at 319-20 (discussing California and Indiana statutes).
105. See id. at 314 (analyzing controlling Indiana law and probate law of New
York and California).
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court's holding, it is important to understand how and why the laws
of several jurisdictions were applicable.
The court ultimately determined that Indiana law applied. 10 6
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York asserted jurisdiction over the original suit filed by CMG and
MMLLC in Indiana when it granted the motion for transfer and
consolidated the suit with SFA's pending suit in New York. 10 7 Nevertheless, the court found that Indiana's choice of law rules applied
because the Indiana action commenced before the New York action.108 As the court's ruling was based on Indiana law, its presence
in the court's discussion was not surprising. 10 9
New York and California were discussed because they represented Monroe's two possible domiciles at the time of her death. 11 0
In Indiana, as in the majority of states, a testamentary document is
administered under the law of the state in which the testator was
domiciled at the time of his or her death.1 1 ' MMLLC and CMG,
whom the court referred to simply as MMLLC, contended that
1 12
Monroe was domiciled in California at the time of her death.
SFA claimed that Monroe was domiciled in New York.1 13 The court
ordered supplemental briefing on the issue of Monroe's domicile. 114 After the briefings, the court found it unnecessary to deter-

mine Monroe's domicile. 1 5 The court reasoned that the laws of
her possible domiciles were sufficiently similar as to not affect the
outcome of the decision. 16 The court instead examined the viabil106. For further discussion of procedural history, see supra notes 16-29, and
accompanying text.
107. See Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 311 (discussing transfer and
consolidation of cases).
108. See Memorandum Decision Regarding Choice of Law, Shaw Family
Archives, Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 2d 203, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(citing first-to-file rule).
109. See Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 311 (describing application
of Indiana choice of law rules).
110. See id. at 311-12 (explaining parties' dispute over Monroe's domicile at
time of death). New York and California were later described as "the only two
states in which Ms. Monroe could conceivably have been domiciled." Id. at 315.
111. See id. at 314 (reciting majority domicile rule).
112. See id. at 312 (stating MMLLC's domicile contention).
113. See id. at 312 (noting SFA's domicile argument). SFA argued that
MMLLC and CMG "should be judicially and collaterally estopped from arguing"
that Monroe was domiciled in California after forty years of arguing that she was
domiciled in New York at the time of her death. Id. at 312.
114. See id. (reporting court order for supplemental briefing following conference held March 12, 2007).
115. See id. at 315 ("[I]t is not necessary to resolve the question of domicile
116. See id. (finding similarities in New York and California probate laws).
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ity of Monroe's postmortem right of publicity claim under the law
of her two possible domiciles, New York and California, as well as
the controlling law in the case: Indiana.' 17 Using the law of these
three jurisdictions, the following subsection will focus on the three
legal issues the court addressed: testamentary capacity, intent to
transfer future entitlements, and statutory limitations on rights created before enactment.
2.

The Court's Three Part Reasoning

a.

Testamentary Capacity

i.

Existence of Postmortem Right of Publicity at Time of Death

The Shaw Family Archives court held that neither New York, California, nor Indiana recognized a descendible right of postmortem
publicity when Monroe passed away in 1962.118 The court, furthermore, quickly determined that New York did not recognize a common law right of publicity. 1 9 Relying on Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc.,
the court found that New York State's protection of persona under
1 20
the New York privacy statutes was limited to living persons.
The court then examined California Civil Code Section 3344.1
and determined that the state did not recognize a property-based
postmortem right of publicity until 1984.121 The court found that
California recognized a right of publicity before 1984; however, that
right was not freely transferable or descendible. 122 Similarly, the
117. See id. at 314 (determining neither California nor New York recognized

postmortem publicity rights).
118. See id. at 314 (stating California was first to recognize descendible "postmortem" right of publicity in 1984). The court evaluated these three jurisdictions
in response to the parties' dispute over domicile. See id. Even though Indiana was
not a possible domicile, its law was included because the limits of its statutory right
of publicity (established by the 1994 Right of Publicity Act) were evaluated in subsequent parts of the decision. See id. at 315.
119. See id. at 314 (citing Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 586 (2d Cir.
1990)).
120. See id.; see also Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 585 (2d Cir. 1990)
(finding New York protection only extends to right of privacy). The 1990 Pirone
opinion cited contemporary opinions and found that the daughters of baseball
great Babe Ruth had no cause of action against producers of a calendar using
photos of Babe Ruth because New York privacy statutes did not create a descendible right. See id.
121. See Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314 (noting when statute was
adopted); see also CAL. Clv. CODE § 3344.1 (West 1999) (finding adoption of statute
created right of postmortem publicity). Originally passed in 1984 as section 990 of
the California Civil Code, the statute outlines the rights and limitations on the use
of deceased personalities' likenesses. See id. For a further discussion of the statutory right of publicity in California, see supra notes 89-93, and accompanying text.
122. See Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314 (describing California
publicity right) (citing Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454 (Cal.
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court concluded that Indiana did not recognize the right until the
passage of its own statute in 1994.123 Prior to 1994, Indiana law
recognized a tort-based right of privacy. 124 The court concluded
that none of the pertinent jurisdictions recognized a descendible
postmortem right of publicity at the time of Monroe's death in
1962.125 MMLLC next contended that even if a right did not exist
at the time of her passing, later statutes conferred the postmortem
126
right of publicity to Monroe and subsequently to her heirs.
ii.

Disposition of Rights After Death

Finding that not one of the pertinent jurisdictions recognized
a postmortem right of publicity at the time of Monroe's death, the
court next explored the possibility that this right matured after
Monroe's death and descended at such time.1 27 The court examined the estate law of Monroe's two possible domiciles: New
York and California. 128 The court found that New York law cleared
determined that a testator's disposable property was limited to that
which the testator possessed at the time of his or her death. 129 Similarly, the court found that California probate law required a testator to control all property he or she wished to transfer at the time of
1979)). In Guglielmi, the nephew of a deceased actor brought suit for the misappropriation of his uncle's likeness by a television production company. See 603
P.2d at 455 (describing facts in complaint). The Guglielmi court held that although the uncle may have had a right to control the use of his "name, likeness, or
personality," this right could not be passed to an heir. Id.
123. See id. (explaining Indiana publicity right); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 3236-1-1 (West 2002) (defining postmortem right of publicity under Indiana law).
For a further discussion of the statutory right of publicity in Indiana, see supra
notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
124. See Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314 (explaining that rights of
publication in Indiana before 1994 were only available for "personal tort action for
invasion of privacy") (citing Cont'l Optical Co. v. Reed, 86 N.E.2d 306, 309 (Ind.
App. 1949)). In Continental Optic Co., a lens company used a soldier's image in
advertisements without authorization. See 86 N.E.2d at 307 (describing basis for
claim). The Indiana court found that the right to privacy "like any other right that
resides in an individual, may be waived or lost." Id. at 309.
125. See Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314 (determining right did
not exist in any of three relevant states).
126. See id. at 315 (discussing second question of testamentary capacity).
127. See id. (finding no relevant jurisdiction recognized right of publicity in
1962).
128. See id. at 314-15 (discussing party contentions as to Monroe's domicile).
129. See id. at 315 ("A disposition by the testator of all his property passes all
of the property he was entitled to dispose of at the time of his death.") (emphasis
added) (quoting N.Y. EsT. PowERs & TRUSTS LAw § 3-3.1 (West 1998)). The court
relied on In reEstate of Gernon, 226 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1960), in finding that no property
acquired after the death of the testator is transferred by the will. See id.
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his or her death. 130 MMLLC contended that the residuary clause of
Monroe's will allowed for the transfer of property acquired after
her death, specifically her right of publicity that California recognized starting in 1984.131 The court rejected MMLLC's arguments,
finding them irrelevant to the law of the pertinent jurisdictions.132
Finding that no postmortem right of publicity transferred automatically at her death, the court next examined the testamentary document for evidence that Monroe intended to transfer rights that
133
would mature after her death.
b.

Intent To Transfer Future Entitlements

The court found no indication that Monroe intended to leave
any future entitlements through the residuary clause of her will. 134
MMLLC argued that the phrase "to which [she] shall be in any way
entitled" in Monroe's will demonstrated her intent to leave future
rights, including the now recognized right of publicity, to her
heirs. 135 MMLLC relied on New York and California law, which
held that evidence of intent is paramount in testamentary interpretation.' 36 The court rejected this contention, finding no evidence
of intent to leave future entitlements and that the residuary clauses,
as read under the law of pertinent jurisdictions, would not permit
transfer of property not possessed at the time of death, even with
130. See id. at 315 ("A will passes all property the testator owns at death, including property acquired after execution of the will.") (emphasis added) (quoting
CAL. PROB. CODE § 21105 (West 2003)).
131. See id. at 316. (citing examples of postmortem property acquisition and
transfer). MMLLC cites section 2-602 of California Uniform Probate Code, which
allows for transfer of "property acquired by the estate after the testator's death."
Id. MMLLC also relied on In re Hite, 700 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Tex. App. 1985), in
which a residuary clause transferred property "that the testator may have overlooked, property that lacked particular definition or property that the testatrix did
not know she was entitled to at the time the will was executed." Id.
132. See id. at 316 (rejecting MMLLC's contentions). The court held that the
Uniform Probate Code had no bearing on the case because neither New York nor
California had adopted the code. See id. Similarly, the court found that the Texas
case, In re Hite, had no effect on the law of the jurisdictions in question. See id.
133. See id. at 317-19 (rejecting argument that testator intent allowed transfer
of property not owned at time of death).
134. See id. at 318 (rejecting MMLLC's contentions).
135. See id. at 318 (discussing MMLLC's interpretation of Monroe's will).
136. See id. at 317-18 (citing New York case law and California probate law).
New York law held testator intent to be the primary consideration in will interpretation. See id. at 317 (citing In re Estate of O'Brien, 627 N.Y.S.2d 544, 544-45 (N.Y.
Sur. Ct. 1995)). Similarly, California law recognized intent as the "cardinal rule"
of will construction. See id. at 317-18 (citing Estate of Karkeet, 56 Cal. 2d 277, 279
(1961)).
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clear intent.1 37 The court examined the language of Monroe's will
and found no evidence of special intent to leave her right of publicity.' 38 Moreover, the court found that even if intent was evident,
residuary clauses do not allow for the division of property not
owned at the time of death.139 Finally, the court rejected a policy
argument that disallowing the transfer of property through the residuary clause favors intestacy. 140 Assured that the testamentary
document did not dispense Monroe's postmortem right of publicity, the court then examined whether modern publicity statutes recognize the publicity rights of people who predeceased the
14 1
enactment of the statute.
c.

Statutory Limitations on Rights Created Before Enactment

The Shaw Family Archives court examined the Indiana and California publicity statutes and found that neither recognized postmortem publicity rights for celebrities who died before the states
enacted the statutes. 142 The California statute allowed the transfer
of the right of publicity only "by contract or by means of a trust or
testamentary documents.' 43 Similarly, the Indiana publicity statute
requires transfer by "contract, license, gift, trust, or testamentary
137. See id. at 317-18 (discussing intent to leave rights created under Indiana
or California publicity statutes). The court pointed to its earlier discussion of residuary clauses and found no support for the contention that Monroe's intent to
leave property that she did not posses at the time of her death should supersede
the limitations placed on residuary clauses by the laws of the pertinent jurisdictions. See id.
138. See id. at 318 (finding no evidence of Monroe's intent). The court described the residuary clause as "boilerplate language [which] is much too slender a
reed on which to hang a devise of postmortem publicity rights that did not come
into being until 22 years after her death." Id. Examining the structure of the
clause, the court found no indication that the language "to which [she] shall be in
any way entitled" was intended to incorporate rights that did not exist at the time
of her death. Id.
139. See id. ("Even if the language Ms. Monroe employed clearly demonstrated her intent to devise property she had no capacity to devise, the effect would
be to render the disposition invalid, because she had no legal right to dispose of
property that did not exist at the time of her death.").
140. See id. at 319 (rejecting MMLLC's policy argument). The court stated
that MMLLC failed to look at Monroe's "legal incapacity to devise what she did not
own." Id. The court found that even a broad reading of the residuary clause
would not allow for the transfer of non-existent rights. See id.
141. See id. at 319-20 (discussing statutory limitations of Indiana and California publicity statutes).
142. See id. at 319 (discussing possible recognition of postmortem publicity
rights for celebrities who passed away before statutory enactments). New York law
was not considered because New York does not have a publicity statute. See id.
143. Id. (quoting CAL.CIv. CODE § 3344.1 (West 1999)). The court held that
because an already deceased personality cannot transfer his or her right of publicity in one of these two ways, a postmortem transfer cannot occur. See id.
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document," each of which require living parties. 144 After evaluating
all the relevant jurisdictions, the court found that the residuary
clause of Monroe's will did not transfer her right of publicity to
MMLLC's predecessors-in-interest.1 45 The court therefore denied
MMLLC's motion for summary judgment and granted SFA's crossmotion for summary judgment, finding that MMLLC had no claim
146
to Monroe's likeness.
B.

Critical Analysis

The court's decision consistently focused on determining what
Marilyn Monroe owned on the day of her death: August 5, 1962.147
On that date, all descendible property rights transferred to her
heirs. 148 The court's determination that Monroe's right of publicity
was not a descendible right on that date ultimately forced the court
to evaluate other possible ways in which that right could have transferred to her estate.' 49 If Monroe's right of publicity was descendible in 1962, the second and third sections of the court's opinion
become unnecessary, as the right would have transferred under the
estate law of her domicile state.' 50 Monroe's most likely domicile at
144. Id. (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-16 (West 2002)). As in California, a
deceased personality in Indiana cannot dispose of his or her right of publicity in
one of the enumerated ways, and therefore the state does not recognize the transfer. See id.
145. See id. at 320 ("[A]ny postmortem right of publicity in Marilyn Monroe
could not have passed to MMLLC's predecessors-in-interest through the residuary

clause of her will.").
146. See id. at 320 (stating court's holding).
147. See id. at 314 ("Ms. Monroe could not devise by will a property right she
did not own at the time of her death."). The court also determined that "it is not
necessary to resolve the question of domicile because neither New York nor California - the only two states in which Monroe could conceivably have been domiciled - permitted a testator to dispose by will of property she does not own at the
time of her death." Id. at 315. The court reasoned that "In re Hite reaffirmed,
rather than undermined, the rule that only property owned at death can be devised by will." Id. at 316. The court relied on "the unequivocal rule that only
property owned by the testator at the time of death can be passed by will." Id. at
317.
148. See id. at 315 (citing probate laws of relevant jurisdictions).
149. See id. at 314 (finding no postmortem right of publicity existed at time of
Monroe's death). The second and third parts of the decision evaluated the other
possible sources of the right, such as Monroe's intent to leave future entitlements
and modern statutory recognition of rights existing before enactment. See id. at
317-19.
150. See id. at 314 (stating Indiana deferred to law of testator's domicile at
time of death for will interpretation). The court discussed these alternative arguments only after determining that the right of publicity did not transfer under the
traditional estate laws of either New York or California. See id. at 317-20.
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the time of her death was New York. 15 1 Although New York does
not recognize a postmortem right of publicity today, it did recognize such a right on August 5, 1962.152
1.

The Significance of August 5, 1962

The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York correctly emphasized the importance of determining
what descendible rights Monroe possessed on the date of her
death. 5 3 The court clearly stated the significance of making this
crucial determination:
[R] egardless of Ms. Monroe's domicile at the time of her
death, and regardless of any rights purportedly conferred
after death by Indiana Right of Publicity Act or by Cal.
Civil Code § 3344.1 - Ms. Monroe could not devise by will a
property right she did not own at the time of her death in

1962. 154
This date of death evaluation was vital because any possible jurisdiction in which Monroe's will could be administered required
that the testator possess all rights to be devised at death. 155 The
court recognized that Indiana was not a possible domicile of
Monroe when she died. 15 6 The court, applying Indiana law, held
that the will would be construed according to the law of Monroe's
domicile at the time of her death. 15 7 The parties disagreed as to
whether Monroe was domiciled in New York or California. 15 8 The
151. For further discussion of Monroe's domicile, see infra notes 160-65 and
accompanying text.
152. See Haelan Labs. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.
1953) (creating term "right of publicity" in application of New York law); see also
Groucho Marx Prods. v. Day & Night Co., rev'd on other grounds, 523 F. Supp. 485,
487-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding common law right of publicity existed in 1981).
But see Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 586 (2d Cir. 1990) (terminating
recognition of common law right of publicity in 1990). For a further discussion of
the history of the right of publicity in New York, see infra notes 170-218 and accompanying text.
153. See Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314 (stating that determination of rights possessed at death is vital).

154. Id.
155. See id. at 315 (stating New York and California estate law only allowed
transfer of rights controlled by testator at time of death).
156. See id. (recognizing New York and California as only possible domiciles).
157. See id. at 314 ("Indiana follows the majority rule that the law of the domicile of the testator at his or her death applies to all questions of a will's
construction.").
158. See id. at 314-15 (listing New York and California as Monroe's only possible domiciles).
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task for the court thus became determining Monroe's state of domicile, as the law of that state would be crucial to deciding which de159
scendible rights Monroe possessed at death.
2.

Marilyn Monroe Was Domiciled in New York at the Time of Her
Death

SFA claimed that MMLLC should be judicially and collaterally
estopped from arguing that Monroe was domiciled in California.1 60
SFA also asserted that the Monroe estate, and now MMLLC, had
successfully argued for nearly forty years that Monroe was domi16 1
ciled in New York at the time of her death.
162
The court did not conclude where Monroe was domiciled.
It is apparent from the opinion that the court felt it unnecessary to
decide Monroe's domicile because the issue did not impact the outcome of the case. 163 Nevertheless, it appeared that SFA's estoppel
claim was warranted, as Monroe's will had long been construed
under New York law without protest from her estate. 164 MMLLC's
argument for California domicile appeared to be an attempt to
avoid seemingly unfavorable New York law, however, New York was
1 65
Monroe's most likely domicile at the time of her death.
159. See
160. See
161. See
162. See
relevant laws

id. (discussing estate laws of Monroe's possible domiciles).
id. at 312 (discussing SFA's argument for estoppel).
id. (stating SFA claim).
id. at 315 (finding it unnecessary to resolve issue of domicile because
of New York and California were similar). The court had previously

requested supplemental briefing on the issue of Monroe's domicile at a March 12,
2007 conference. See id. at 312.
163. See id. at 314-15 (finding that neither New York nor California law recognized descendible right of publicity in 1962). The court noted that New York still
did not recognize a transferable right of publicity. See id. at 314. The court also
found that California did not recognize such a right until 1984. See id.
164. See id. at 312 (discussing probate of will). The court stated that Monroe's
will was "subject to primary probate in New York County Surrogate's Court." Id.
Moreover, probate in New York was not contested at any time during the probation of the primary beneficiary's will. See id.; see also Estate of Marilyn Monroe,
Deceased, N.Y. L.J., June 20, 2002, at 23, col. 2 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. June 19, 2002)
(describing more recent litigation involving Monroe's will). The court discussed
Miracle v. Strasberg, No. 92-00605, Dec. 23, 1992 (D. Haw.), in which the alleged
granddaughter of Marilyn Monroe, Nancy "Miracle" Greene, claimed an inheritance from the Monroe estate. See id. The court interpreted the will according to
New York law and concluded that Greene was not a pretermitted heir. See id.; see
also Strasberg v. Odyssey Group, Inc., 51 Cal. App. 4th 906, 911 (1996) (stating that
Monroe's will was probated in New York). Monroe died in Los Angeles, California,
where ancillary proceedings to probate her will began in 1963. See Strasberg,51 Cal.
App. 4th at 911. As ancillary proceedings, the California proceedings were merely
supplemental to the official New York probate proceedings. See id. at 912 n.2.
.165. For a further discussion of Monroe's domicile for probate purposes, see
supra note 164.
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Dismissal of Possible New York Recognition of Right of Publicity

Assuming that New York was most likely Monroe's domicile at
the time of her death, it becomes important to reexamine the
166
court's evaluation of New York law at the time of her death.
Again, this aspect of the court's evaluation goes to the ultimate determination of what rights Monroe possessed at the time of her
death and which of those rights were descendible. 1 67 In a single
sentence, the court dismissed the possibility that New York recognized a common law right of publicity in 1962.168 Today, New York
does not recognize a common law right of publicity beyond what is
protected by the New York privacy statutes. 169 The following discussion of New York publicity law, however, will show that such a right
existed in 1962.
a.

New York Publicity Law in 1962

Haelan Laboratorieswas both a theoretical landmark in the history of the right of publicity as well as a practical landmark in the
judicial history of New York State. 170 As this section will discuss, the
court's recognition of the doctrinal separation between privacy and
publicity allowed a common law right of publicity to exist alongside
the statutory right of privacy for many years. 17 1 Although New York
courts later questioned the existence of this independent right, in
1 72
1962 New York recognized a property-based right of publicity.
166. See Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 314-15 (discussing applicable
New York law).
167. See id. at 314 (stating overarching legal necessity that Monroe possess all
rights intended to be devised).
168. See id. ("To this day, New York law does not recognize any common law
right of publicity and limits its statutory publicity rights to living persons.").
169. See Stephano v. News Group Publ'ns., 474 N.E.2d 580, 583-84 (N.Y. 1984)
(finding New York privacy statutes encompass publicity rights).
170. See Nimmer, supra note 31, at 218 (discussing theoretical evolution and
application of New York law regarding right of publicity). For further discussion of
Haelan Labs. v. Topps Chewing Gum, see supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text.
171. See Haelan Labs. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.
1953) (juxtaposing privacy and publicity rights). The court clearly stated that "in
addition and independent of that right of pivacy (which in New York derives from
statute), a man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph." Id.; see also
Price v. Hal Roach Studios, 400 F. Supp. 836, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), abrogated byJim
Henson Prods. v. John T. Brady & Assoc., 867 F. Supp. 175, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(discussing existence of right of publicity outside statutorily derived right of
privacy).
172. See Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 585 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding
that New York does not recognize post-mortem right of publicity). But see Haelan
Labs., 202 F.2d at 868 (finding existence of publicity right in 1953); see also Factors
Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., rev'd on other grounds, 579 F.2d 215, 220-21 (2d Cir. 1978)
(continuing recognition of right of publicity in New York through 1978).
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Further, this common law right of publicity was transferable and
173
descendible.
The discussion of a common law, property-based postmortem
right of publicity in New York began in 1952 when the New York
Court of Appeals decided Gautierv. Pro-Football,Inc., a year before
Haelan Laboratories.1 74 The plaintiff in Gautierwas an animal trainer
who performed on the field during the halftime show of a professional football game. 175 The plaintiff claimed the Washington Redskins organization violated his right of privacy by broadcasting his
halftime performance without his permission.' 7 6 The court found
that the New York privacy statutes were inapplicable because the
very public nature of the performance constituted a waiver of his
privacy right.17 7 A concurring opinion, however, indicated that a
new understanding of privacy and publicity was in order. 178 In his
concurrence, Judge Desmond noted the inadequacy of the New
York privacy statutes in this situation saying that "[the plaintiff's]
grievance here is not the invasion of his 'privacy' - privacy is the
one thing he did not want, or need, in his occupation."179 Moreo173. See Groucho Marx Prods. v. Day & Night Co., rev'd on other grounds, 523 F.
Supp. 485, 487-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (describing New York publicity right as descendible common law right); see also Factors Etc., Inc., 579 F.2d at 221 (discussing transferable nature of publicity rights in New York).
174. SeeGautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485, 488 (N.Y. 1952) (distinguishing publicity rights from privacy rights).
175. See id. at 487 (discussing facts of case). The plaintiff performed his act
before 35,000 fans at Griffith Stadium in Washington D.C. See id. New York had
jurisdiction because an estimated 17,000 television sets in New York were tuned to
the game. See id. The New York Court of Appeals found that this was sufficient to
establish that the plaintiffs picture was used in New York State. See id.
176. See id. (stating plaintiffs complaint). The plaintiff sued the owner of the
Washington Redskins football team, Pro-Football, with whom he had signed a contract to perform. See id. The plaintiff also brought suit against the companies
whose advertisements appeared during the performance, claiming they profited
from the use of his likeness. See id.
177. See id. at 489 (discussing waiver of privacy). The court stated:
While not a part of the game proper, he did become a part of the legitimate public spectacle as a while by appearing between the halves, and
voluntarily occupying the very center of attraction for several minutes.
Under these circumstances it can hardly be said that his right of privacy
was invaded.
Id.; see also Nimmer, supra note 31, at 204-06 (evaluating waiver of privacy). Professor Nimmer described the argument that celebrities waive any right to privacy by
performing as one of the shortcomings of the legal system of the time. See id. at
205. Turning to Gautierin particular, Nimmer found that performers are not concerned with their privacy when they are in front of an audience; instead, they are
concerned with their right to control profit and reproduction. See id.
178. See Gautier, 107 N.E.2d at 489 (Desmond, J., concurring) (recognizing
crucial difference between private and public interests in likeness).
179. Id.
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ver, Judge Desmond wrote that the plaintiff's complaint may well be
justified, but was simply not the province of the New York privacy
statutes. 180
Haelan Laboratories,decided one year after Gautier,appeared to
establish that a common law right of publicity did exist in New York
in the mid-1950s.' 8 ' It would be more than twenty years until
courts would again specifically address the right of publicity in New
York. 18 2 Cases decided in this interim period focused on the application of the New York privacy statutes, and were never pushed to
evaluate the existence of the common law rights debated by the
higher courts.18 3 Nevertheless, when courts took up the topic again
in the 1970s, the maturation of the common law right of publicity
8 4

seemed complete.'

Pricev. Hal Roach Studios, decided in 1975, cited Haelan Laboratories and expanded on its findings about the right of publicity,
thereby confirming the existence of the right throughout the relative dark-period on the issue.' 8 5 Plaintiffs Lucille Hardy Price and
Ida K. Laurel, the widows of silent-era comedians "Laurel and
Hardy," sued the film studio for which their late husbands' had
180. See id. (discussing N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAw sections 50 and 51 (McKinney
1992)). Judge Desmond stated that the New York privacy statutes do not offer
redress for this type of invasion. See id. No real violation of the "right of privacy"
occurred when the plaintiff performed in front of a stadium of people, yet the
judge recognized that some cause of action may be warranted. See id. at 489-90.
181. For a further discussion of Haelan Labs., see supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text.
182. See Factors Etc., Inc., v. Pro Arts, Inc., rev'd on other grounds, 579 F.2d 215,
220 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting "dearth of New York case law in this area.").
183. See, e.g., Lomax v. New Broad. Co., 238 N.Y.S.2d 781, 782 (N.Y. App. Div.
1963) (holding that oral consent and estoppels are only partial defenses against
written consent to use one's likeness under the New York privacy statutes); Pittera
v. Parade Publ'ns., 225 N.Y.S.2d 478, 479 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962) (finding claim
insufficient under New York privacy statutes because likeness was not used for
trade or advertising purposes); Moglen v. Varsity Pajamas, Inc., 213 N.Y.S.2d 999,
1001 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961) (stating dismissal of case was proper because New York
privacy statutes require intentional use of likeness for trade purposes); Schneiderman v. New York Post Corp., 220 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961) (finding
failure to obtain plaintiffs' consent to be mentioned in newspaper article made
defendant liable under New York privacy statutes). Compare Miller v. Universal Pictures Co, 201 N.Y.S.2d 632, 634 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961) (finding plaintiff, band
leader Glen Miller, did not own property right in big band sound), with Price v.
Hal Roach Studios, 400 F. Supp. 836, 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), abrogated byJim Henson
Prods. v. John T. Brady & Assoc., 867 F. Supp. 175, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (distinguishing property rights in sound from property rights in publicity).
184. See, e.g., Price,400 F. Supp. at 843 (stating that both privacy and publicity
rights existed in New York in 1975)
185. See id. at 843-44 (relaying conception of publicity and privacy rights from
Haelan Labs.).
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worked claiming unauthorized use of name and likeness. s 6 Applying New York law, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York found that both Laurel and Hardy had a right
of publicity that was "a property right, distinctfrom the statutory protection, in his name and likeness." 18 7 The court found this distinction
to be so evident that the only issue it felt compelled to discuss was
whether the right was descendible.18 8 The court found that in
claiming the right was not descendible, the defendants had confused the statutory right of privacy, which is not descendible, and
the independent right of publicity, which is a property right and
therefore is descendible.' 8 9 As the statutory right of privacy in New

York was an attempt to "prevent injury to feelings," it was logical
that the right would not be assignable during life and would terminate at death. 19 0 The right of publicity, on the other hand, had a
"purely commercial nature" which was assignable and
descendible 1 9 1
In FactorsEtc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals further elaborated on New York's conception of publicity
during this relative dark period.1 92 Boxcar Productions was a Tennessee corporation through which legendary entertainer Elvis Presley and his manager marketed Presley's likeness. 193 When Presley
died in 1977, his father was appointed executor of his will and he,
186. See id. at 837-38 (describing claims of case). The defendants claimed
they were entitled to use the names and likenesses of the comedians for the following three reasons: (1) employment agreements with the actors gave the studio exclusive and concurrent rights to use the likenesses; (2) the studio had copyrights
on the films in which the likenesses were used; and (3) the studio was allowed to
use the actors' likenesses along with the general public because any claim of privacy had been waived. See id. at 839.
187. Id. at 844 (emphasis added). The plaintiffs, the widows (both residents
of California) and Larry Harmon Pictures Corporation (a California corporation),
were California residents. See id. at 837-38. Defendants, Hal Roach Studios (a Delaware corporation with its principle place of business in New York) and Richard
Feiner & Co. (a New York Partnership) were New York residents. See id. at 838.
188. See id. at 844 ("The question which remains open is whether the right of
publicity terminates upon death of the individual or whether it is descendible.").
189. See id. (discussing descendible nature of publicity right).
190. See id. (describing intent of N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW sections 50-51 (McKinney 1992)).
191. See id. (clarifying distinction between privacy and publicity rights). The
court found that the commercial nature of one's publicity made it logically assignable. See id. It found no reason that this assignable right ought to terminate upon
the death of the personality. See id. The court held the assignable and descendible
qualities of publicity were the reasons it was deemed a property right. See id.
192. See 579 F.2d 215, 220 (2d Cir. 1978) rev'd on other grounds, 652 F.2d 278
(2d Cir. 1981) (discussing New York common law right of publicity).
193. See id. at 216-17 (discussing control of likeness rights while Presley was
alive).
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together with Boxcar Productions, granted Factors Etc., Inc. ("Factors") "the exclusive license to exploit commercially the name and
likeness of Elvis Presley."1 94 Factors then brought suit against Pro
Arts, Inc. ("Pro Arts") in the Southern District of New York after
Pro Arts marketed a poster memorializing the death of Presley,
which was in violation of Factors's exclusive license. 9 5 The court
discussed Prosser's four invasions of privacy and focused on the final understanding under which injury is the result of uncompensated exploitation of likeness.' 96 The court then focused on the
unjust enrichment accruing to Pro Arts, stating that "[n]o social
purpose is served by having the defendant get free some aspect of
the plaintiff that would have market value and for which he would
normally pay."'197 The Second Circuit recounted its own decision in
Haelan Laboratorieswhere it "recognized that the right of publicity
exists independent from the statutory right of privacy and that it
can be validly transferred by its owner. ' 19 8 The court held that
"there can be no doubt that Elvis Presley assigned to Boxcar [Productions] a valid property right, the exclusive authority to print,
publish and distribute his name and likeness." 19 9 The court concluded that its decision was in keeping with other applications of
New York law that recognized the inherent distinction between the
rights.

20 0

194. Id. at 217.
195. See id. (describing facts and procedural posture of case). Factors warned
Pro Arts that it must discontinue the sale of its poster or they would be subject to a
lawsuit for injunctive relief. See id. Pro Arts did not stop its distribution, but rather
filed an action against Factors in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio seeking a declaratory judgment that it had not infringed the rights
claimed by Factors. See id. Upon discovering the Ohio suit, Factors brought suit
against Pro Arts for license infringement in United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York. See id. Pro Arts failed to carry its burden in requesting a transfer to the Ohio court and the District Court for the Southern District of New York proceeded with action filed by Factors. See id. at 218-19. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found no abuse of discretion by the district court for assuming jurisdiction in New York. See id. at 219.
196. See id. at 220 (applying Prosser's analysis). For a further discussion of
Prosser's rubric of privacy rights, see supra notes 50-62 and accompanying text.
197. Factors Etc., Inc., 579 F.2d at 220 (quoting Harry Kalven, Privacy in Tort
Law - Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong? 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331
(1966)).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 221.
200. See id. (citing Price v. Hal Roach Studios, 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), abrogated byJim Henson Prods. v. John T. Brady & Assoc., 867 F. Supp. 175,
190 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)). The court found Price "particularly persuasive" because it
was an application of New York law to a similar dispute over ownership of commercial rights of the deceased. Id.
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The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York reaffirmed the existence of a common law right of publicity in New York in Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day & Night
Co. 20 1 The dispute in Groucho Marx Productionsarose from the production of a musical play featuring characters traditionally portrayed by legendary comedians "The Marx Brothers." 20 2 The
plaintiffs, heirs of the Marx brothers, claimed infringement and
misappropriation of the likenesses that they owned as beneficiaries
of the brothers' respective wills. 20 3 The court again clearly differentiated between New York's "statutory protections against the invasion of privacy of living persons" and the publicity rights of dead
celebrities which "must stem from common law."20 4 The court offered one of the most definitive summations of New York law regarding publicity at the time: "[a]lthough no state court has ruled
on the issue, several federal courts, including the Second Circuit,
have concluded that a right of publicity does exist in New York." 20 5 The
court recounted the Second Circuit's decision in Haelan Laboratories
and its affirmation by Price and Factors,Etc., among others - that
the right of publicity is fully transferable and therefore cannot be
considered a personal right. 20 6 Finding that the Second Circuit was
undoubtedly clear in this determination, the court simply explored
whether any recent opinions had disagreed with the federal interpretation of the right.20 7 No courts disagreed. 20 8 The existence of
201. See 523 F. Supp. 485, 487-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (recognizing that several
federal courts, applying New York law, have concluded that right of publicity existed in New York).
202. See id. at 486 (discussing basis of action). The brothers, Adolph "Harpo"
Marx, Julius "Groucho" Marx, and Leo "Chico" Marx, were known for their unique
comedic appearance and mannerisms in the 1920s. See id.
203. See id. (asserting various claims based on ownership of likenesses). The
plaintiffs asserted that New York recognizes a common law right of publicity. See
id. at 487. Moreover, the plaintiffs argued that the right is descendible. See id.
The plaintiffs also claimed that the First Amendment did not limit the scope of the
right of publicity in this case. See id.
204. Id. at 487.
205. Id. (emphasis added).
206. See id. at 488 (finding support for New York recognition of publicity
rights).
207. See id. (remarking on clarity of Second Circuit's opinion on issue).
208. See id. at 488-89 (evaluating two recent New York Supreme Court Appellate Division cases). The court looked first at Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 427
N.Y.S.2d 828 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (mem.), which involved the publication of
Marilyn Monroe's biography. See id. at 488. The state court found that the New
York privacy statutes did not apply because Monroe was deceased. See id. at 489.
The court did not, however, dispose of the right of publicity claim as part of the
statutory claim. See id. Instead, the court dismissed the publicity claim on separate
grounds, claiming that First Amendment considerations would prevail over any
right that Monroe's estate may own. See id. The court also looked at Brinkley v.
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a common law right of publicity alongside the statutory right of privacy appeared to exist at least as late as 1981.209

New York's recognition of the right of publicity remained until
1984, when the New York Court of Appeals made it clear that the
right no longer existed in New York. 2 10 In Stephano v. New Group
Publications, a model claimed that an advertiser used a picture of
him in a bomber jacket without his consent, in violation of section
51 of the New York Civil Rights Law and the common law right of
publicity. 2 11 This court determined that the New York privacy statutes did indeed apply to this type of misappropriation. 21 2 Finding
that the state's privacy statute actually provided for this type of violation, the court stated that the plaintiff could not claim the existence
of common law right of publicity. 2 13 The court evaluated the claim

under the statute, giving no further credence to common law
rights.

2 14

The Second Circuit adopted New York's new interpretation of
publicity in Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc. 215 Dorothy Ruth Pirone and
Julia Ruth Stevens, daughters of baseball great George "Babe" Ruth,
sued the producers of a calendar that contained the name and image of Ruth. 2 16 Citing Stephano and overturning Factors, the court
Casablancas,438 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), in which a model sued to
enjoin the sale of a poster bearing her likeness. See id. The state court concluded
that the New York privacy statutes and the state and federal cases defending the
common law right of publicity were not suitable in this case. See id. The district
court took this ruling as an indication that New York courts were indeed willing to
recognize the pecuniary value of persona. See id.
209. See id. at 487 (recognizing that New York's common law right of publicity
existed in 1981).
210. See Stephano v. New Group Publ'ns., 474 N.E.2d 580, 583-85 (N.Y. 1984)
(finding that New York privacy statutes were sufficiently broad to cover publicity
interests).
211. See id. at 581 (discussing facts of case).
212. See id. at 584 (discussing breadth of statutes). The court found that "the
statute applies to any use of a person's picture or portrait for advertising or trade
purposes whenever the defendant has not obtained the person's written consent to
do so." Id.
213. See id. (finding right of publicity is "encompassed" by New York privacy
statutes).
214. See id. at 584-87. (finding New York privacy statutes inapplicable). The
court found that the picture used, along with the accompanying text, was sufficiently newsworthy, and therefore not an "advertisement or trade purposes" under
the New York privacy statutes. See id. at 584-86.
215. See id. at 586 (encompassing view of New York privacy statutes from
Stephano).
216. See id. at 581 (describing facts of case). Plaintiffs claimed common law
trademark infringement and unfair competition. See id. They sought permanent
injunction for the use of Ruth's likeness and the name "Babe Ruth" over which
they claimed trademark rights. See id.
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held that the New York privacy statutes encompassed the once-recognized common law right of privacy.2 1 7 After decades of recognition, New York law no longer supported claims based on the
2 18
common law right of publicity.
b.

Residuary Clause and Statutory Limitations

The court's evaluation of Monroe's intent to transfer future
entitlements through the residuary clause of her will became unnecessary if it was established that the publicity rights in question
existed at the time of Monroe's death. 2 19 The court agreed that the
intent of the testator is the "touchstone" of will construction, but
found that intent was bound by the limitations of what the testator
controlled at death. 2211 The court did not question the residuary
clause's power to transfer non-enumerated rights that existed at the
time of death.2 2 1 If the court determined that a property-based
right of publicity existed at the time of death, then the residuary
clause would have the power to transfer the right, and the question
of Monroe's intent to leave future rights she did not possess would
22 2

be unnecessary.
The court's discussion of the possibility that the Indiana or California publicity statutes may have allowed transfer of postmortem
publicity rights before their enactment becomes similarly unnecessary. 2 2 3 The court entertained this discussion only after dismissing
the possibility of transfer by the testamentary document. 224 If the
217. See id. at 585 (adopting Stephano ruling).
218. See id. at 586 (stating Factors Etc., Inc. no longer good law). But see id. at
585 (discussing period of recognition under Factors Etc., Inc.).
219. See Shaw Family Archives, Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d
309, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding argument of intent to devise future entitlements
unpersuasive).
220. Id. (discussing intent to leave future entitlements). The court found no
evidence that Monroe intended to leave future entitlements. See id. Moreover, the
court found that even if such intent was present it would not have created a valid
transfer because probate law of the relevant jurisdictions prohibited transfer of
rights not possessed at time of death. See id.
221. See id. at 319 (discussing residuary clauses). The court found that residuary clauses should be read broadly, encompassing any interests recognized in law
or equity. See id. The court stated: "Ms. Monroe explicitly recognizes that her
powers of testamentary disposition are limited to property she owns at time of her
death." Id. at 318.
222. Compare id. at 319 (recognizing residuary clause transfer of existent
rights), with id. at 318 (finding testator intent paramount for existent rights, but
not future entitlements).
223. See id. at 319 (discussing pre-enactment recognition as last possible transfer means).
224. See, e.g., id. at 318 (stating unequivocal division rule). The court concluded that testamentary documents, under the law of either possible domicile,
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publicity right indeed existed in New York, and Monroe was indeed
domiciled there when she died, then the right would have descended to her heirs and no retroactive statutory recognition from
2 25
these states would be required.
V.

IMPACT

The estates of New York actors, authors and musicians, whose
bodies of work earned them iconic status and posthumous profits,
will feel the immediate impact of this case. 22 6 Although New York

courts reevaluated the state privacy statutes in the 1980s and 1990s,
this decision may force the legislature to reexamine the efficacy of
22 7
the current statutes.
The New York privacy statutes were created during the infancy
of the right of privacy.22 8 The New York legislature enacted the
statutes just thirteen years after Warren and Brandeis first voiced
their joint concern over the offensive use of likeness. 229 Over the
next century, the entertainment industry grew exponentially and
the rights associated with likeness changed. 230 Scholars recognized
this evolution, as did several state legislatures who enacted statutes
to protect commercial interest in likeness. 231 For a time, New York
common law followed this evolution and provided protection for its
residents.

2 32

Recent rulings, including Shaw Family Archives, have

233
showed the state's reluctance to defend the right of publicity.

cannot transfer rights not possessed at time of death; thus, recognition - if there is
to be any - must come from another source. See id.
225. See id. at 313-14 (declaring transfer at time of death is primary analysis).
226. For a further discussion of profitability of deceased celebrities, see supra
notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
227. See Edelman, supra note 96, at 39 (predicting legislative review).
228. For a further discussion of the New York privacy statutes, see supra notes
94-100 and accompanying text.
229. See Nimmer, supra note 31, at 206 (discussing Warren and Brandeis's
concern over emotional injury and embarrassment).
230. See id. at 204 (discussing entertainment industry development). Dean
Prosser discussed the growing challenges facing the New York privacy statutes. See
id. Prosser mentioned the profitability issues presented by newspapers and
magazines when the statutes were passed. See id. Prosser also showed concern with
the statutes' ability to adapt to ever-growing exposure on radio, television and film.
See id.
231. See id. at 204-14 (discussing current legal system's inadequate publicity
protection); see also IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1 -20 (West 2002) (stating Indiana
statutory publicity protection); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West 1999) (outlining
California statutory protections).
232. For a further discussion of the possible recognition of common law right
of publicity in New York, see supra notes 170-218 and accompanying text.
233. See Shaw Family Archives, Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d
309, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding no postmortem right of publicity in New York);
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The battle for recognition of this lucrative right in New York has
existed for some time. 23 4 The high-profile nature of the likeness
and the great sums of money involved in this case may exert new
2 35
pressure on the legislature to recognize the right of publicity.
This case also sparked a reevaluation of the right of publicity in
California. 23 6 Unlike New York, however, the California legislature
took definite steps by amending section 3344.1 of the California
Civil Code to expressly protect the rights of celebrities who passed
away before the statute's enactment. 23 7 California's reactionary expansion of its already progressive publicity statute may well place
even greater pressure on New York to recognize the right of public238
ity in the wake of this decision.
Although the fortunes of entertainment's elite may turn some
off to their cause, it is only fair to remember that it is "a first principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence, an axiom of the most fundamental nature, that every person is entitled to the fruit of his labors
"239

John C. Fuller*

see also Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 586 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating New
York does not recognize common law right of publicity).
234. See Parker, supra note 90, at 4A (describing recognition efforts). Actors
and musicians such as Al Pacino and Yoko Ono have taken part in the debate over
likeness in New York. See id.
235. See Shaw Family Archives, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 312 (recognizing Monroe's
popularity). The court describes Monroe as "perhaps the most famous American
sex symbol of the twentieth century." Id.; see also Goldman & Paine supra note 1
(calculating $7 million in MMLLC revenues in 2007).
236. See Parker, supra note 90, at 4A (discussing debate in California). The
proponents of the bill were 1960s sitcom-actress-turned-state-Senator Sheila Kuehl,
the Screen Actors Guild, and the estate of actorJohn Wayne. See id. Opponents of
the bill, supporting photographers' rights, included the estates of actor Marlon
Brando and musician Ray Charles. See id.
237. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(b) (West 2007) (expanding publicity rights
to already deceased celebrities).
238. See Parker, supranote 90, at 4A (telling of actors debating publicity issues
in New York).
239. Nimmer, supra note 31, at 216 (emphasis added).
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, Villanova University School of Law; B.A., 2005, Colgate University; Editor-in-Chief, Villanova Sports & Entertainment Law Journal,
Volume XVI.
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